Article Courtesy of David Simonds of Hogan Lovells
Sibayan v. De Guzman (In re De Guzman), 670 B.R. 567 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., June 9, 2025).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a defendant chapter 7 debtor who prevailed in a nondischargeability adversary proceeding could recover attorney’s fees under California Civil Code § 1717, even though the plaintiff creditor styled his complaint only to allege tort-based, not contract-based, claims. The decision emphasized that “artful pleading” does not necessarily insulate against exposure to prevailing party attorney’s fees for actions effectively “on a contract” under California Civil Code § 1717.
The dispute arose out of a shareholder buyout agreement between two equal shareholders, plaintiff Elmar Sibayan (“Creditor”) and his former business partner, defendant Junder Joe Basbas de Guzman (“Debtor”). Under the agreement, Debtor was required to pay Creditor $275,000, consisting of $137,500 in cash and $137,500 secured by a note and deed of trust (“DOT”) against Debtor’s residence. The deal contemplated that the DOT would be executed and held in escrow, to be recorded after Debtor refinanced his home to raise the cash payment. Although Debtor refinanced his home in early 2022, Creditor did not record his DOT until February 2023. In the interim, Debtor obtained a home equity line of credit secured by a deed of trust in favor of another lender, which recorded prior to Creditor’s DOT. As a result, Creditor was left undersecured when Debtor eventually commenced a chapter 7 case.
Creditor initiated an adversary proceeding seeking to except the debt from discharge under Bankruptcy Code sections 523(a)(2) and (a)(6), alleging fraud and willful and malicious conduct. He argued that Debtor intentionally delayed recording the DOT to subordinate Creditor’s lien position and that he misrepresented his intent to comply with the agreement. The Bankruptcy Court rejected Creditor’s claims, concluding that while Debtor may have breached his contractual obligations, Creditor failed to establish that Debtor acted willfully and with malice. The Bankruptcy Court thus ruled the debt dischargeable.
Following this outcome, Debtor moved for attorney’s fees under the reciprocal fee provision of California Civil Code § 1717, invoking the fee clauses contained in the note and DOT. Creditor opposed, arguing that his complaint had been framed solely in tort and thus was not an action “on a contract” under § 1717. The Bankruptcy Court disagreed, explaining that California courts liberally construe the phrase “on a contract,” extending it to any action involving a contract where enforcement of the agreement must be examined. Here, because Creditor’s fraud and willful misconduct allegations depended on the terms of the buyout agreement, note, and DOT, the adversary proceeding was necessarily “on a contract.”
The Bankruptcy Court further reasoned that § 1717 applies in bankruptcy proceedings whenever its elements are satisfied. It traced the development of the law, noting that the Ninth Circuit’s prior Fobian rule, which excluded fees for litigation raising solely bankruptcy law issues, had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007). Citing Penrod v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Penrod), 802 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015), the Bankruptcy Court noted that, after Travelers, California Civil Code § 1717 applies in all bankruptcy litigation when a party prevails in an action “on a contract” and otherwise satisfies the essential elements of that statute.
Applying these principles, the Bankruptcy Court found all three elements of § 1717 attorney fee awards were satisfied: (1) the action was “on a contract,” because the court necessarily had to construe the buyout agreement, note, and DOT to resolve the nondischargeability claims; (2) the relevant contracts included attorney’s fee clauses; and (3) Debtor was the “prevailing party” because he had prevailed in the adversary proceeding. Accordingly, the Court awarded Debtor $19,514.40 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
The decision underscores that creditors who pursue nondischargeability claims tied to contractual obligations risk fee-shifting under § 1717, even if they frame their pleadings in tort rather than contract. As the Bankruptcy Court noted, artful pleading cannot obscure the reality that litigation centered on contract enforcement falls within California Civil Code § 1717.
